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TOWARD A UNIFORM STATE PRODUCT LIABILITY
LAW-VIRGINIA AND THE UNIFORM PRODUCT
LIABILITY ACT
The Department of Commerce drafted the Uniform Product Liability
Act (UPLA)I in response to an apparent product liability insurance crisis.
2
Regarding most proposed product liability legislation as anti-consumer,
3
the Commerce Department attempted to draft a statutory scheme which
would balance the interests of consumers and product sellers and promote
uniformity among the states.' Beyond these broad purposes, the drafters
identified the related UPLA goals of reducing insurance costs,5 providing
reasonable compensation for injured claimants, creating incentives for
those persons in the best position to prevent harm,7 expediting the repara-
tions process,8 and minimizing the litigation costs9 through a compara-
tively specific law." To achieve these goals, the UPLA codifies substantive
product liability law" and provides specific procedures to decrease the
IAll references to the Uniform Product Liability Act are to the draft version published
at 44 Fed. Reg. 2296 (1979).
2 See 43 Fed. Reg. 14,612 (1978). The unavailability of affordable product liability insur-
ance for manufacturers led to the formation of the Federal Interagency Task Force on Product
Liability in June 1976. The Task Force reported that the cost of insurance premiums had
increased sharply in recent years. As a result of this increase, the Task Force believed that,
unless a product were to be discontinued, businesses must choose between increasing con-
sumer prices and foregoing adequate insurance coverage. The Task Force estimated that in
some situations as much as fifteen percent of a product's price was attributable to insurance
costs. Alternatively businesses which forego insurance severely limit the ability of an injured
user to collect damages. Id. at 14,612-13. The UPLA drafters concluded from the Task Force's
report that a uniform state law would increase the predictability of product liability litigation
and thereby enable insurers to set premiums which reflect more accurately a product's risk.
UPLA, Preamble, § 101, 44 Fed. Reg. 2997.
43 Fed. Reg. 14,613; see UPLA § 101(a)(4), 44 Fed. Reg. 2997. The Department of
Commerce referred to proposed legislation which would deny recovery whenever the user
assumed the product's risk, was contributorily negligent, or misused the product. 43 Fed. Reg.
14,613.
44 Fed. Reg. 2996.
Id. The drafters intended to create a situation where product sellers engaging in safe




I Id. The drafters noted that long delays between the injury and a damage award do not
serve consumer interests, and attempted to fashion procedures which would shorten such
delays. Id.; see, e.g., text accompanying notes 151-156 infra.
44 Fed. Reg. 2996. Although recognizing that the elimination of the jury trial would
minimize litigation costs, the drafters reasoned that the jury serves an important role in
product liability cases by providing individualized judgments and the experience of ordinary
persons and concluded that the value of the jury outweighs its expense. Id.
" Id. at 2996-97.
" See text accompanying notes 18-141 infra.
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time and costs of litigation."
Virginia lacks a comprehensive product liability statute. Although
some statutes are applicable to product liability claims, 3 most governing
principles have developed through case law. 4 In addition, general adjudi-
cation procedures apply to the product liability area.'" The enactment of
the UPLA by Virginia, therefore, would substitute a comprehensive statute
for the uncertainty of the present common law development. While some
provisions of the UPLA reflect Virginia law," other provisions would
change both the substantive and procedural aspects of the current law.' 7
In deciding whether Virginia should adopt the UPLA, such changes should
be evaluated carefully in light of the policies which they promote.
The UPLA's substantive provisions set forth definitions of defects for
which liability may be imposed, 8 methods of proving or disproving the
existence of such defects, 9 and specific events which may terminate the
product seller's responsibility for harm caused by his product. 0 Although
the UPLA substitutes a single claim21 for causes of action previously based
on negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability, 2 the UPLA's stan-
12 See text accompanying notes 142-306 infra.
'1 See, e.g., VA. CODE § 8.2-314 (1965) (implied warranty of merchantibility applicable
to sale of goods).
", See, e.g., McClanaham v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712
(1953) (seller required to warn user of product's incidential dangers and dangers arising from
failure to follow directions for use).
'5 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 160-165 infra.
" See, e.g., UPLA § 104(B), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998; text accompanying notes 43-52 infra.
'7 See, e.g., UPLA § 109(B)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. 2999-3000; text accompanying notes 109-
125 infra.
IS See UPLA §§ 104, 105, 44 Fed. Reg. 2998; text accompanying notes 24-72 infra.
" See UPLA §§ 106, 107, 44 Fed. Reg. 2998-99; text accompanying notes 74-102 infra.
See UPLA §§ 109, 110, 44 Fed. Reg. 2999-3000; text accompanying notes 103-141 infra.
The UPLA defines "product seller" as "any person or entity . . . who is engaged in the
business of selling. . . products, whether the sale is resale, or for use or consumption." UPLA
§ 102(1), 44 Fed. Reg. 2997-98. The definition specifically includes manufacturers, wholesal-
ers, distributers, retailers, lessors and bailors of products and excludes the occasional private
seller. Id; see UPLA § 102(1) (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. 3003. In addition, the drafters suggest
that a seller who performs services is a "product seller" only if those services are incidential
to the sale of the product while sellers of real estate should be included in the definition only
if engaged in the mass production and sale of homes. Finally, the drafters allow individual
states to decide the UPLA's applicability to commercial sellers of used goods. UPLA § 102(1)
(Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. 3003. The UPLA separately defines "manufacturer" to include prod-
uct sellers who "prepare a product or component of a product prior to its sale to a user or
consumer," as well as a non-manufacturer who represents itself as a manufacturer. UPLA §
102(5), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
21 A product liability claim under the UPLA includes claims for personal injury, death,
and property damage caused by "the manufacture, construction, design, formula, prepara-
tion, assembly, installation, testing, warnings, instructions, marketing, packaging, or labeling
of any product." UPLA § 102(2), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
2 UPLA § 103(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998. Under traditional theories, a plaintiff injured by a
product must base his claim on negligence, breach of warranty or strict liability in tort. In a
negligence action, a seller is liable only if he fails to exercise reasonable care in the manufac-
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dards of responsibility, defining the types of defects for which liability may
be imposed2 exemplify the drafters' intent to clarify current product liabil-
ity law. Under the UPLA, liability may be imposed when a claimant 4
proves that a product's faulty construction,2 defective design,' 2 or inade-
quate warnings caused his harm.? In Virginia, whether a claimant bases
his claim on negligence or breach of warranty, his recovery depends upon
proof that the product was unreasonably dangerous for its foreseeable pur-
poses when it left the product sellers' control.21 Construction and design
defects as well as inadequate warnings may render a product unreasonably
dangerous under Virginia law.2 Recognizing the inherent difficulty of de-
fining "unreasonably" and "unforeseeability", the UPLA drafters at-
tempted to identify the elements which triers of fact in various jurisdic-
tions consider in determining whether products are unreasonably danger-
ous and whether uses are unforeseeable.2 Therefore, although the concep-
tual framework of the UPLA differs from the traditional negligence and
warranty theories, if the UPLA retains those elements currently considered
by triers of fact in Virginia, Virginia's adoption of the UPLA's standards
of responsibility would codify current product liability case law.
Under the UPLA, a product's construction is defective when the prod-
ture or sale of a product. See W. PROSsER, THE LAw OF ToRS § 96 (4th ed. 1971). A plaintiff
proceeding under a warranty theory must prove that the product's defect was a breach of an
express or implied warranty. Id. § 97. Finally, under a strict liability theory, a commercial
seller may be held liable for selling an unreasonably defective product. The strict liability
theory omits the necessity of proving the product seller's negligence and bars contract defen-
ses such as lack of privity. See id. § 98; REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 402A (1965).
2 UPLA § 104, 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
24 The UPLA defines "claimant" as a person harmed by a product including a user,
consumer, or bystander, who asserts a legal cause of action. UPLA § 102(3), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
"Harm" includes damage to property and personal physical injuries including emotional
harm. Although harm to the product is included, damage caused by loss of the product's use
is excluded from coverage unless the product seller expressly warrants against such loss.
UPLA § 102(4), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
UPLA § 104(A), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998; see text accompanying notes 32-41 infra.
26 UPLA § 104(B), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998; see text accompanying notes 42-52 infra.
2 UPLA § 104(C), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998; see text accompanying notes 53-68 infra.
" UPLA § 104, 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
29 See, e.g., Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 968 (4th Cir. 1971) (applying
Virginia law); Logan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 216 Va. 425, 428, 219 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1975).
Claims based on negligence are distinguishable from those based on warranty by the defenses
available. Contributory negligence is an available defense to a tort claim, see Brockett v.
Harrell Bros., Inc., 206 Va. 457, 462-63, 143 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1965), while product misuse is
an available defense to a breach of warranty claim, see Layne-Atl. Co. v. Koppers Co., 214
Va. 467, 473-74, 201 S.E.2d 609, 614 (1974). Virginia does not recognize actions based upon
strict liability. See Briggs v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 89, 92 (E.D. Va. 1973).
30 See, e.g., Matthews v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1973) (applying Virginia
law; construction defect); Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 217
S.E.2d 863 (1975) (design defect); McClanahan v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 194 Va. 842,
75 S.E.2d 713 (1953) (inadequate warnings).
" See UPLA § 104 (Analysis); 44 Fed. Reg. 3004.
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uct does not comply with the manufacturer's own specifications or design."
The UPLA imposes strict liability on the product seller for harm caused
by such defects.? The Virginia legislature and judiciary have not adopted
strict liability, but continue to rely instead on negligence and breach of
warranty theories of recovery. 4 The warranty of merchantibility under the
Virginia Commercial Code requires that a product be fit for its ordinary
purposes, and a seller is responsible when his product causes harm while
being used for its intended purpose. 5 Since neither the exercise of reasona-
ble care nor the lack of privity of contract constitute defenses to a breach
of warranty action, 38 a form of strict liability can be imposed under Virginia
law similar to that imposed by the UPLA.3 Unlike the UPLA, however,
32 UPLA § 104(A), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998; see § 104(A) (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. 3004. To
determine whether a particular product's construction is defective, the trier of fact may
consider that product's specifications and its deviation from similar products. Id. Since the
particular product's defectiveness depends upon deviation from its manufacturer's standard,
a manufacturer could escape liability for construction defects by designing poor quality
products. In such situations, however, liability could be imposed on the basis of design
defects. See UPLA § 104(B), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998; text accompanying notes 43-52 infra.
33UPLA § 104(A) (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. 3004. The UPLA's drafters modeled § 104(A)
on the Restatement of Torts, which imposes strict liability on anyone "who sells any product
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
... if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected
to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which
it is sold." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TomRs § 402A (1965). In contrast to a cause of action
based on negligence, under a strict liability claim the seller's failure to exercise due care in
the product's manufacture or sale is irrelevant. See id. § 402A(2) (a). Accordingly, the UPLA
provides that evidence tending to prove the exercise or failure to exercise due care is inadmis-
sible in defective construction cases. Cf. UPLA § 106, 44 Fed. Reg. 2998-99 (such evidence
admissible in defective design and failure to warn cases). Under the Restatement, privity of
contract between the claimant and the product seller is not a defense to a strict liability
claim. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(b) (1965). The UPLA similarly abol-
ishes lack of privity as a defense in all products liability claims. See UPLA § 103(b), 44 Fed.
Reg. 2998. The UPLA imposes strict liability for construction defects. See UPLA § 104
(Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. 3004-05. Since the Restatement imposes strict liability whenever a
product's defect is "unreasonably dangerous", a claimant may proceed on a strict liability
theory for unreasonably dangerous design defects or inadequate warnings. RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TomRS § 402A, comment j; see, e.g., Tomer v. American Home Prod. Corp., 170 Conn.
681, 368 A.2d 35 (1976) (failure to warn); Allen v. Kewance Mach. & Conveyor Co., 23 Ill.
App. 3d 158, 318 N.E.2d 696 (1974) (design defect).
" See, e.g., Briggs v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 89 (E.D. Va. 1973). The court in
Briggs refused to approve a jury instruction concerning strict liability because Virginia had
not adopted that theory of recovery. Id. at 92.
' VA. CODE § 8.2-314(2)(c) (1965); see Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity'" Statute:
Strict Products Liability Under The Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. REv. 804, 825
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Speidel].
11 See note 34 supra. Virginia has abolished the privity defense in all actions based on
warranty and negligence. See VA. CODE § 8.2-318 (1965). The Virgina anti-privity statute is
broader in scope than any of the three alternatives proposed by the Uniform Commercial
Code and is not based on a third party beneficiary theory. Compare VA. CODE § 8.2-318 with
U.C.C. § 2-318.
"7 See Speidel, supra note 35, at 828-39 & n.61.
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the Virginia Commercial Code enables the product seller to exclude or
modify warranties, and shifts to the buyer the duty to discover apparent
defects.3 8 Adoption of this provision of the UPLA would significantly mo-
dify Virginia law. The buyer and seller cannot delegate the risk of a con-
struction defect under the UPLA regardless of their relative bargaining
positions. 9 While this modification would be insignificant in many con-
sumer situations, the UPLA is not limited to the average consumer trans-
action. 0 When two commercially sophisticated parties negotiate a con-
tract, or when a buyer purchases a product at a discount with knowledge
of possible defects, a policy intended to protect the consumer without
adequate bargaining power should not alter the terms of the sale."
In contrast to construction defects where a claimant must establish
only the existence of a defect in the product itself,4" establishing design
defects requires the claimant to prove that the product seller should have
utilized a safer design.43 In reaching a verdict, the trier of fact must con-
sider the likelihood and gravity of the claimant's injury,44 the feasibility of
an alternative design, and the possibility that the alternative design would
cause additional harm." Under current Virginia law, a product's design is
defective when unreasonably dangerous for its ordinary and foreseeable
purpose." A product is unreasonably dangerous when the likelihood and
severity of injury outweigh the availability and cost of alternative designs
which would avoid such injuries." Where Virginia law demands that a
VA. CODE §§ 8.2-314, 8.2-316 (1965). Language excluding or modifying the implied
warranty of merchantibility must be conspicuous and specify the merchantibility warranty.
Id § 8.2-316(2). In addition, warranties can be excluded by language which indicates plainly
the exclusion or by the buyer's opportunity to inspect the product. Id. § 8.2-316(3). A seller
can modify or limit consequential damages under Virginia law only if such modification is
not unconscionable. Id. § 8.2-316(2) & (3); see Matthews v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399,
402 (4th Cir. 1973) (limitation of damages for personal injuries ineffective; manufacturer and
dealer liable for automobile mechanical defect).
11 See UPLA § 104(A) (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. 3004 (no provision for delegation of the
risk).
" See UPLA § 103(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
" See generally Speidel, supra note 35, at 848-51.
12 UPLA § 104(A), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998; see text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
4 UPLA § 104(B), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
" The UPLA requires the likelihood of the product causing the claimant's harm to be
considered according to the knowledge existing at the time of the product's manufacture.
However, a product seller may be liable for inadequate warnings if he discovers a risk in the
product after its manufacture and sale and does not issue proper warnings. See UPLA §
105(b), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
" UPLA § 104(B), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
48 See, e.g., Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 968 (4th Cir. 1971) (applying
Virginia law); Logan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 216 Va. 425, 428, 219 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1975).
11 See, e.g., Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974). In
Dreisonstok, the plaintiff argued that the automobile manufacturer owed the consumer the
duty of designing a vehicle that would withstand collisions under any circumstances. Apply-
ing Virginia law, the court held that, while automobile accidents are foreseeable, a manufac-
turer need not adopt a safer design which would substantially increase the vehicle's cost. 489
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suggested design modification be consistent with the product's utility and
purpose,4" the UPLA drafters intentionally omitted reference to the prod-
uct's utility.49 Focusing instead on the technical feasibility of a design
alternative," the drafters sought to avoid the necessity of value judgments
regarding a product's social function.5' Since Virginia limits consideration
of utility to technical feasibility,52 however, the UPLA's change would not
modify Virginia law. The elements considered by a Virginia trier of fact in
determining the reasonability of a product's risks, therefore, essentially
parallel the factors that a trier of fact under the UPLA considers in deter-
mining the existence of a design defect. Thus, adoption of this provision
would clarify Virginia law by substituting more objective criteria for the
subjective standard based on reasonableness.
The UPLA further imposes liability on product sellers who fail to pro-
vide consumers or users with adequate product warnings or instructions.13
The trier of fact must balance the likelihood and severity of the claimant's
injury against the product seller's ability to anticipate the user's knowl-
edge of the product's risks and the feasibility and cost of warnings in
determining whether the UPLA requires warnings. 54 In Virginia, a product
seller must anticipate reasonably foreseeable dangers arising from a prod-
uct's normal use and warn potential users of those risks.55 The product
seller's actual or constructive knowledge of the product's risk will support
a finding of foreseeability under Virginia law. The product seller, how-
F.2d at 1070-73. See also Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F..2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973). Spangler
concerned the need for a warning bell on a crane. Again applying Virginia law, the 4th Circuit
stated that the reasonable need for such devices depended upon the product's use. Moreover,
a manufacturer can expect that the employer or his employees will recognize an open and
obvious hazard and take necessary precautions to avoid injury. Id. at 375. Finally, since the
plaintiff's employer supplied the specifications for the crane, the manufacturer ordinarily
could not be liable for defects in those plans. Id.
11 See Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974). The
Dreisonstok court held that the utility and purposes of a product governs the necessity of a
design change. Thus, while the placement of a Volkswagen van's engine in the rear of the
vehicle may decrease the passengers' protection, the same feature makes the vehicle fit for
its intended purpose of hauling passengers and cargo. Therefore, the court held that the
plaintiff's inability to show the existence of a design modification consistent with the vehicle's
purpose barred recovery. Id. at 1072-73.
11 See UPLA § 104 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. 3005.
30 See UPLA § 104(B), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
s, See UPLA § 104 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. 3005.
s See Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974). Discussing
the utility and purpose of the vehicle, the Dreisonstok court considered the availability of a
design modification rather than the overall social value of the van. See id. at 1072-74.
53 UPLA § 104(C), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998. The product seller's duty to warn depends upon a
product's inherent risk rather than the existence of a defect. See UPLA § 104(c) (Analysis),
44 Fed. Reg. 3005.
' UPLA § 104(C)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
5 See Olgers v. Sika Chem. Corp., 437 F.2d 90, 91 (4th Cir. 1971); McClanahan v.
California Spray-Chem. Corp., 194 Va. 842, 852-53; 75 S.E.2d 712, 721-22 (1953).
" See Olgers v. Sika Chem. Corp., 437 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1971). In Olgers, the plaintiff's
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ever, must foresee only the normal uses of his product. 5 The UPLA again
substitutes clear and objective considerations of likelihood and severity of
injury for the subjective determination of unreasonably foreseeable dan-
gers.
Enactment of the UPLA would replace Virginia's open and obvious
danger defense with a balancing test to ascertain the need for warnings.
Since Virginia does not require warnings of risks apparent to the foreseea-
ble user,58 the existence of an open and obvious danger is an affirmative
defense to liability. In contrast, under the UPLA the product seller's abil-
ity to anticipate the user's knowledge of the product's risk is balanced
against the feasibility and cost of warnings." Therefore, a trier of fact
under the UPLA could impose liability for failure to warn despite the
seller's justified anticipation that the user would recognize the risks in-
volved. The UPLA's drafters rejected the position that the existence of an
open and obvious danger should constitute an affirmative defense, reason-
ing that the product seller should provide warnings where inexpensive
warnings could prevent potentially serious harm. 0 Since the causation
decedent contracted aplastic anemia from exposure to the vapor, fumes and dust of the
defendant's product. Although the defendant had no actual knowledge that his product would
cause such harm, the court held that the defendant should have reasonably foreseen that his
failure to provide warnings would result in a serious injury. Id. at 91. See also Spruill v. Boyle-
Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962). In Spruill, the defendant's knowledge of children's
deaths caused by drinking its furniture polish established foreseeability. Id. at 88.
-1 Defining a product's foreseeable uses has proven difficult. See, e.g., Spruill v. Boyle-
Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962); Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216
Va. 245, 217 S.E.2d 863 (1973); McClanahan v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 194 Va. 842,
75 S.E.2d 718 (1953). In Spruill, the court held that the product seller must consider the place
where his product normally is used. Since the product, furniture polish, normally is used in
the home, the seller could have foreseen the possibility that a child would consume the
product. 308 F.2d at 83-84. The McClanahan court imposed the additional duty of foreseeing
that the user might follow, the normal method of using similar products. Therefore, the
manufacturer must warn of any dangers of using such a method. 194 Va. at 852-53, 75 S.E.2d
at 721-25. The Turner court, however, held that a product seller has no duty to foresee the
deliberate misuse of a product, especially where the product is used in an industrial environ-
ment. Thus, a product seller was not liable when the improper use of a hoist caused an injury
to an employee. 216 Va. at 250-52, 217 S.E.2d at 868-69.
5R Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962); Reed v. Carlyle & Martin,
Inc., 214 Va. 592, 202 S.E.2d 874, cert denied, 419 U.S. 859 (1974). In Reed, a farmer was -
injured when he fell into the beaters of an insilage wagon while attempting to unclog them.
Although the farmer's conduct complied with the customary conduct of farmers, the open and
obvious danger of the beaters undercut the manufacturer's duty to warn of the danger. 214
Va. at 594-95, 202 S.E.2d at 876-77. In Spruill, since the product's appearance did not reveal
its danger to the average housewife, the failure to warn of its danger resulted in the manufac-
turer's liability. 308 F.2d at 83-84.
59 UPLA § 104(C), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
See UPLA § 104(C) (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. 3005-06 (citing Marschall, An Obvious
Wrong Does Not Make a Right: Manufacturers' Liability for Patently Dangerous Products,
48 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 1065 (1973)). Persuaded by such reasoning, other jurisdictions have abro-
gated the defense based upon the existence of an open and obvious danger. See, e.g., Byrns
1979]
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requirement continues to limit the product seller's liability,6 the UPLA's
requirement that the trier of fact consider and weigh the claimant's likely
knowledge of the product's risk would not affect most verdicts. In those few
situations affected by the change, the seller should be held liable for his
failure to take the precaution since a simple warning from the product
seller could have prevented the harm.
Under both Virginia law and the UPLA, the product seller must give
complete warnings of a product's dangers and instructions regarding its
proper use.62 The UPLA requires at a minimum that product sellers direct
all necessary warnings to the persons best able to take precautions against
the risks.13 Since Virginia law requires product sellers to direct warnings
and instructions to potential users," adoption of the UPLA would lessen
the product seller's minimum responsibility to the consumer. In most situ-
ations, however, the user is the person best able to prevent product-caused
harm. " Moreover, a product seller may be held to a higher standard under
the UPLA when the likelihood and severity of a potential injury outweigh
the cost of directly informing the user.6" While perhaps lowering the prod-
uct seller's minimum responsibility, adoption of this UPLA provision
would not actually change his liability since the trier of fact must find that
a nonuser could have been expected to prevent the harm 7 and that the
possibility of injury justified the cost of directly informing the product's
user.6"
By establishing liability for inadequate warnings in addition to the
liability for design defects, the UPLA drafters recognized that some prod-
v. Riddel, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976); Casey v. Gifford Wood Co., 61 Mich. App.
208, 232 N.W.2d 360 (1975).
61 Under the UPLA, the claimant must prove both that the failure to provide adequate
warnings would have prevented injury to the reasonably prudent person. UPLA § 104(C), 44
Fed. Reg. 2998. Virginia law requires the claimant to prove that the failure to give proper
warnings was the proximate cause of his harm. See Briggs v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., 357 F. Supp.
89, 91 (E.D. Va. 1973).
62 See Sadler v. Lynch, 192 Va. 344, 64 S.E.2d 664 (1951); UPLA § 104(C), 44 Fed. Reg.
2998.
13 UPLA § 104(C)(3), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
" In Virginia, warnings regarding a product's danger must indicate the nature and extent
of the product's risk in such a manner that a reasonably prudent person using the product
will notice the warnings. See Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 85 (4th Cir. 1962).
"5 Under Virginia law, the product user is not necessarily the person affected by the
product's adverse effects. Thus, a manufacturer breached his duty of care by failing to warn
an average user that drinking furniture polish could cause a child's death. Spruill v. Boyle-
Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 85-86 (4th Cir. 1962). Although by drinking the polish the child
could have been considered the product's user, the manufacturer was required to warn only
the child's mother, the normal user. See id. at 85. Thus, in the Spruill context, the user was
the person best able to take precautions against the product's dangers.
66 See UPLA § 104(C)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
67 See UPLA § 104(C)(3), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
66 See UPLA § 104(C)(1)(d), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998; § 104(C) (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. 3005-
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ucts contain "unavoidably unsafe aspects" which design modifications
cannot rectify." If a product contains such an unsafe feature, a product
seller fulfills his responsibility to consumers by explicitly warning of the
product's risks.7 0 Virginia law has developed the concept of "inherently
dangerous products" to cover such unsafe aspects. An inherently danger-
ous product is one whose potential danger arises from the nature of the
product itself rather than the existence of a defect. 7' Adequate warnings
must accompany products considered inherently dangerous.7 2 Since liabil-
ity under either current Virginia law or the UPLA depends upon the suffi-
ciency of the warnings, adoption of this provision of the UPLA would not
alter existing Virginia law.
After setting forth the product seller's responsibilities to the con-
sumer,73 the UPLA establishes rules of evidence for the admission of evi-
dence concerning the state of the art, 7 industry customs7 5 and safety stan-
dards71 to prove or disprove liability based upon a defective design or
inadequate warnings. 7 Under these provisions, evidence of changes in
product design, the state of the art or industry custom is inadmissible if
offered to establish design defects or inadequate warnings.78 However, since
a product seller's compliance or noncompliance with industry customs
may show the availability of safe alternative designs or the necessity of
warnings," evidence of industry custom at the time of the product's manu-
facture is admissible to prove the product's defect. 0 Reasoning that com-
pliance with the state of the art at the time of the product's manufacture
" UPLA § 105, 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
,0 Id. The adequacy of warnings is determined according to the terms of UPLA § 104(C).
See text accompanying notes 53-68 supra.
11 See Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 83 (4th Cir. 1962). To establish that a
product was inherently dangerous, the claimant must prove that the defendant knew or
should have known of the product's dangerous aspects. Id. at 88; see text accompanying notes
53-68 supra.
" See note 64 supra.
" UPLA § 104, 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
1' The state of the art is "the safety, technical, mechanical, and scientific knowledge in
existence and reasonably feasible for use at the time of manufacture." UPLA § 106(a), 44
Fed. Reg. 2998.
75 Industry customs are the procedures generally followed by a particular industry in
manufacturing or selling a product. See, e.g., Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc.,
216 Va. 245, 251, 217 S.E.2d 863, 868 (1975).
' See note 84 infra.
" UPLA §§ 106, 107, 44 Fed Reg. 2998-99. Since construction defects occur when a
product does not conform to its own specifications, evidence of the state of the art, industry
customs or safety standards are irrelevant. See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
79 UPLA § 106(b), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998. If the probative value of evidence of subsequent
changes in the product's design, the relevant state of the art or industry custom outweighs
the potential prejudice, such evidence may be admissible to prove such factors as the defen-
dant's knowledge of the defect. Id.; see UPLA § 106 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. 3006-07.
" See UPLA § 106 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. 3007.
UPLA § 106(c), 44 Fed. Reg. 2999.
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tends to show the nonexistence of a safer alternative,"' the UPLA drafters
provided that evidence of such compliance will raise a presumption 2 of the
nondefectiveness of the product.83 Furthermore, a determination by the
court that the product conformed with qualifying safety standards8' also
raises a presumption that the product was not defective.'
In determining whether a product was unreasonably dangerous, Vir-
ginia law similarly requires consideration of relevant safety standards,
industry customs and the state of the art.8 Under both Virginia law and
the UPLA, 7 evidence of subsequent changes in the state of the art, safety
standards and industry customs is irrelevant and therefore inadmissible if
offered to establish the product's defect,8 Furthermore, the admissibility
of safety standards, industry customs and the state of the art depends upon
their relevance to the particular product at issue.8 Unlike the UPLA,
however, Virginia creates no presumptions when a product seller has com-
plied with qualifying safety standards or the state of the art. 0 Although
, See UPLA § 106 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. 3007.
2 To rebut the presumption that the product was not defective, the claimant must
introduce clear and convincing evidence of the product's defect in light of the factors enumer-
ated in UPLA § 104(B) & (C). UPLA § 106(d), 44 Fed. Reg. 2999; see text accompanying
notes 43-55 & 53-54 supra. The UPLA defines "clear and convincing evidence" as "that
measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or
conviction as to the allegations sought to be established." UPLA § 102(7), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
UPLA § 106(d), 44 Fed. Reg. 2999.
81 For a safety standard to qualify, the court must find that the agency responsible for
its promulgation relied on careful testing and safety evaluition and represented both manu-
facturing and consumer interests. Additionally, the safety standard must have been consid-
ered more than a minimum standard when formulated and have been up to date when the
product at issue was manufactured. UPLA §§ 106(e), 107(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 2999.
" UPLA §§ 106(e), 107(b), 44 Fed. Reg. 2999. Clear and convincing evidence may rebut
the presumption of nondefectiveness raised when a product conforms with qualifying safety
standards. See note 82 supra.
" An unreasonably dangerous product may subject the product seller to liability for
defective design or inadequate warnings. See Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d
1066, 1071-76 (4th Cir. 1974) (defective design); Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79,
83-84 (4th Cir. 1962) (failure to warn).
" See UPLA § 106(b), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998; note 94 infra.
n See Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 253, 217 S.E.2d 863, 869
(1975) (post accident change inadmissible). Since the Federal Rules of Evidence preclude
admission of evidence of subsequent changes to establish the existence of a defect, such
evidence is inadmissible in Virginia products liability cases tried in both federal and state
courts. See FED. R. EVID. 407.
"' See, e.g., Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1074 (4th Cir. 1974).
In Dreisonstok, evidence that an automobile could be designed to withstand collisions better
was inadmissible since the vehicle at issue was a van and the safer designs related to other
types of vehicles. Id.
" The trier of fact in Virginia considers compliance or noncompliance with relevant
safety standards, industry customs and the state of the art in determining liability. See, e.g.,
Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 217 S.E.2d 863 (1975). In Turner,
the plaintiff asserted that the absence of a safety hook on a hoist rendered its design defective.
The court held that while evidence of compliance with industry custom does not establish
PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
Virginia law usually requires a high degree of relevance before admitting
such evidence,9" the UPLA presumptions clearly increase the burden on
claimants. Under Virginia law, as under the UPLA, the claimant must
establish the existence of a product defect by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.2 Under the UPLA, however, once a presumptibn is raised, the
claimant can overcome it only through clear and convincing evidence. 3
Moreover, since the UPLA does not provide similar presumptions of defec-
tiveness when a product fails to conform to safety standards or the state
of the art," the adoption of this provision of the UPLA would benefit
product sellers without offering a corresponding benefit to consumers.
To recover from a product seller under the UPLA, a claimant must
establish not only that the product causing his injury was defective, but
also that the product seller caused the defect. 5 Accordingly, the UPLA
provides that a product seller shall not be liable for harm that would not
have occurred but for the modification of the product by a third party,
unless the product seller reasonably should have anticipated such modifi-
cation." Under Virginia law, a plaintiff must prove that the product was
unreasonably dangerous for its foreseeable uses when it left the product
seller's control whether he bases his claim on negligence or breach of war-
ranty. 7 Thus, the product seller is not liable where a product becomes
unreasonably dangerous after leaving the product seller's control" or when
due care in every case, such compliance will establish due care if the plaintiff does not
introduce evidence to show that the custom was unsafe. Id. at 251, 217 S.E.2d at 868.
" See note 89 supra.
" Collins v. Smith, 198 Va. 778, 782, 96 S.E.2d 818, 822 (1957); UPLA § 104, 44 Fed.
Reg. 2998.
, See note 82 supra.
" See UPLA §§ 106, 107, 44 Fed. Reg. 2998-99. Under Virginia law, violation of a statute
or government regulation regarding product safety constitutes negligence per se, thereby
obviating proof regarding the applicable standard of due care and foreseeability. See Or-
thopedic Equip. Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455, 461 (4th Cir. 1960); McClanahan v. California
Spray-Chem. Corp., 194 Va. 842, 851-52, 75 S.E.2d 712, 718 (1953). Since the UPLA does not
address the effect of noncompliance with such standards, present Virginia law would remain
applicable despite enactment of the UPLA. See UPLA § 103(c), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998; § 107
(Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. 3008.
" UPLA § 104, 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
" UPLA § 110, 44 Fed. Reg. 3000. A third party alteration or modification of the product
at issue will defeat a claim based upon construction or design defects or inadequate warnings.
The UPLA defines alteration or modification to include changes in design, formula, function
or use as well as failure to observe routine care and maintenance. UPLA § 110(b), 44 Fed.
Reg. 3000. A product seller may be liable despite third party alteration if the alteration either
was in accordance with the seller's instructions, was consented to by the seller, or was reason-
ably anticipatable by the seller. UPLA § 110(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 3000.
,7 See Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 968 (4th Cir. 1971); Logan v. Montgo-
mery Ward & Co., 216 Va. 425, 428, 219 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1975).
" See Tuttle v. United States Slicing Mach. Co., 335 F.2d 63, 64 (4th Cir. 1964); Logan
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 216 Va. 425, 428, 219 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1975). The plaintiff in
Logan sought damages for injuries caused by an exploding stove. Since an expert had not
examined the stove subsequent to the accident, there was no testimony regarding the cause
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the product is used in an unforeseeable manner.9 Noting the broad inter-
pretation of "foreseeability" in some jurisdictions,10 the UPLA drafters
restricted the product seller's potential liability to modifications which the
product seller reasonably should have anticipated.' 0' Nevertheless, since
Virginia narrowly interprets foreseeability, any foreseeable product modifi-
cation under Virginia law would be "reasonably anticipated" under the
UPLA.
102
In addition to the provisions establishing the substantive requirements
of a products liability claim, the UPLA establishes time limitations for
bringing such actions. The UPLA imposes liability on the product seller
only for those injuries caused by a product during its "useful safe life,"'01 3
unless the product seller expressly warranted the product for a longer
period.1'4 The trier of fact determines whether a product's useful safe life
expired prior to the injury by considering certain enumerated factors.""
Current Virginia law does not recognize the "useful safe life" concept. The
amount of time between the purchase of the product and the injury, how-
ever, is relevant in Virginia in determining whether the defendant has been
negligent or has breached a warranty. 6 Although the UPLA limits the
product seller's liability by providing specific guidelines for determining a
product's useful safe life, the weight attributed to each factor is left to the
of the explosion. Therefore, the jury could have inferred that faulty installation or the pur-
chaser's own acts caused the explosion rather than an inherent defect in the stove. For this
reason, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the jury's verdict for the product seller. 216 Va.
at 428-29, 219 S.E.2d at 687-88.
"1 See Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 251, 217 S.E.2d 863, 868
(1975). Although the jury in Turner could have found that the plaintiff's injury would not
have occurred had the hoist been equipped with a safety hook, the direct cause of the accident
was the unforeseeable misuse of the hoist. Since the use of a product in an unforeseeable
manner voids the implied warranty of merchantibility and the manufacturer has no duty to
warn of the dangers arising from unforeseeable misuse, a verdict for the manufacturer was
proper. Id. at 251-52, 217 S.E.2d at 868-69; see note 57 supra.
" See UPLA § 110 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. 3010, (citing Blim v. Newberry Indus., Inc.,
443 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1971)). In Blim, the manufacturer was held liable despite the removal
of a safety guard by the plaintiff's co-worker because the removal was "foreseeable". 443 F.2d
at 1128. In Virginia, the plaintiff in Blim would not have recovered. See Tuttle v. United
States Slicing Mach. Co., 335 F.2d 63, 64 (4th Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (manufacturer not
liable when protective grill removed from meat grinder); note 98 supra.
1*1 UPLA § 110(a)(3), 44 Fed. Reg. 3000. Reasonably anticipated conduct is defined as
"conduct which could be expected of an ordinary prudent person who is likely to use the
product." UPLA § 102(6), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998.
102 See note 100 supra.
02 A product's useful safe life is defined as the time during which the product reasonably
can be expected to perform in a safe manner. UPLA § 109(A)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. 2999.
UPLA § 109(A)(2), 44 Fed. Reg. 2999.
03 In determining whether a product's useful safe life has expired, the trier of fact may
consider the effect of natural deterioration, local conditions, normal repairs and replace-
ments, the product seller's representations regarding useful safe life, and any modifications
by third parties. UPLA § 109(A)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. 2999.
I"' See Carney v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 309 F.2d 300, 305 (4th Cir. 1962).
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judgment of the trier of fact.107 Since Virginia triers of fact currently con-
sider the same elements in determining product liability, "0 the enactment
of this UPLA provision would clarify rather than change Virginia product
liability law.
The UPLA also imposes time limitations on product liability claims
through statutes of repose.' 9 Unlike the statute of limitations which runs
from the date a cause of action accrues,"10 the statutes of repose set a limit
on the product seller's liability based upon the product's age."' Under the
UPLA's statute of repose for workplace injuries, a claimant entitled to
statutory workmen's compensation may sue the product seller for injuries
occurring within ten years after the original delivery of the injury causing
product.1' 2 After ten years, however, a worker may sue only his emloyer.3
The employer then may seek contribution from the product seller to the
extent of the seller's responsibility for the injury."'
Enactment of the UPLA statute of repose for workplace injuries would
substantially change current Virginia law, since Virginia places no time
restrictions on liability apart from applicable statutes of limitations."5 In
addition, Virginia's Workmen's Compensation Act constitutes the em-
ployee's sole right against his employer for injuries received in the course
of his employment."' An employee, however, can proceed against the third
party responsible for his injuries."' In such a case, the employer, to the
extent of his liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act, has a right
of subrogation to the employee's claim against the third party.,", The
UPLA provisions reverse this procedure when a product over ten years old
causes an injury. In such situations, the UPLA enlarges the employer's
"' See note 105 supra.
' See note 106 supra.
10 UPLA § 109(B), 44 Fed. Reg. 2999-3000. The statutes of repose set a time limitation
on the product seller's potential liability. The purpose of such statutes is to increase the
predictability of a product seller's liability and to alleviate the inherent difficulty in defend-
ing a claim after the passage of a significant period of time. See UPLA § 109(B) (Analysis),
44 Fed. Reg. 3009. Although the statutes of repose limit the potential liability of the product
seller in certain situations, they will not always apply. If the seller expressly warrants the
product's life for more than ten years, the product seller will be liable during the warranty
period. A seller's intentional misrepresentation or concealment, if a substantial cause of the
claimant's harm, also will avoid the limits of the statutes. In addition, the statutes do not
apply where the injury results from prolonged exposure to the product. Finally, the statutes
of repose do not limit actions for contribution or indemnification. UPLA § 109(B)(3), 44 Fed.
Reg. 3000; see text accompanying notes 195-248 infra.
110 See text accompanying note 133 infra.
' See UPLA § 109(B), 44 Fed. Reg. 2999-3000.
"' UPLA § 109(B)(1)(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 2999.
' UPLA § 109(B)(1)(b), 44 Fed. Reg. 2999.
"I UPLA § 109(B)(1)(d), 44 Fed. Reg. 2999, see text accompanying notes 215-229 infra.
m See text accompanying notes 135-138 infra.
116 VA. CODE § 65.1-40 (1973).
' See, e.g., Veale v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 205 Va. 822, 139 S.E.2d 797 (1965).
"' VA. CODE § 65.1-41 (1973).
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liability to include all lost wages of the injured employee," 9 and limits the
employee's potential recovery for his injuries. 2 ' Since the product seller
would be responsible only for contribution, 2' the UPLA reduces his poten-
tial liability at the expense of both the employer and the injured em-
ployee.'2
The UPLA reflects the belief that the employer can prevent most work-
place injuries and, therefore, should be liable when such a preventable
injury occurs. '2 Where a product causes harm because of misuse or the lack
of proper maintenance, therefore, the product seller has no liability under
the UPLA. 1 4 Thus, in most cases where the employer could have prevented
injury, the product seller's liability is nonexistent without the protection
offered by the UPLA's statute of repose. Finally, although the drafters cite
data indicating that few product liability claims arise after ten years, ' the
severe limitation on the injured employee's recovery in such situations is
not justifiable.
The UPLA's statute of repose for nonworkplace injuries,2 6 also operates
to restrict a product seller's liability for products over ten years old. For
nonworkplace injuries, the UPLA establishes a rebuttable presumption
that a product's useful safe life ends ten years after its sale.27 Since a
product seller is not liable for injuries occurring beyond a product's useful
safe life,'2 the presumption effectively limits most product liability claims
to products sold recently. Virginia product liability law does not recognize
presumptions of nonliability when products reach a certain age. Rather,
Virginia law dictates that the product's age at the time of an injury merely
is a factor in determining liability.2 9 The UPLA provision clearly benefits
the product seller by presuming that a ten year-old product has reached
the end of its useful life. In setting the ten year limitation, the drafters
"' The basic measure of recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act is two thirds
of the employee's average weekly wages during the employee's disability period. See VA. CODE
§ 65.1-54 (1973). Under the UPLA, the employer's liability would include all lost wages.
UPLA § 109(B)(1)(b), 44 Fed. Reg. 2999. The UPLA also gives an employer a cause of action
against the product seller if the employer is found liable for his employee's injury. See UPLA
§ 109(B)(1)(d), 44 Fed. Reg. 2999-3000; text accompanying notes 230-248 infra.
120 In a Virginia action against a third party, an employee can recover normal damages,
including medical expenses, lost wages and pain and suffering. His UPLA recovery, however,
is limited to lost wages when a product more than ten years old causes his injury. UPLA §
109(B)(1)(b), 44 Fed. Reg. 2999.
121 UPLA § 109(B)(1)(d), 44 Fed. Reg. 2999-3000.
122 See note 120 supra.
I" See UPLA § 109(B)(1) (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. 3009.
12, See UPLA § 110, 44 Fed. Reg. 3000; text accompanying notes 95-102 supra.
'2 See UPLA § 109 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. 3009.
126 UPLA § 109(B)(2), 44 Fed. Reg. 3000.
127 UPLA § 109(B)(2), 44 Fed. Reg. 3000. The presumption that a product's useful safe
life has expired can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Id.; see note 82 supra.
1 UPLA § 109(A)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. 2999.
120 See text accompanying note 106 supra.
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hoped to reduce product liability insurance premiums 30 If few product
liability claims arise after ten years, as the drafters assert, 3' the risk of
liability would not be decreased significantly by the ten year limitation.
Moreover, if the drafters relied on inaccurate data in setting the ten year
limitation,' injured claimants could be restricted severely in their ability
to recover damages.
Finally, the Act establishes a three year statute of limitations for prod-
uct liability claims which runs from the time that the claimant discovered
or should have discovered the facts which gave rise to the claim. 3 3 This
UPLA provision conflicts with the applicable Virginia statutes of limi-
tations. Virginia distinguishes between personal injury claims and claims
involving property damage.1u A two year statute of limitations governs
causes of action based upon personal injuries, 3 and runs from the date of
the injury.' 3 An action for property damage, however, must be commenced
within five years'37 after the breach of contract or duty which caused the
harm. 1' Thus, the adoption of the UPLA's statute of limitations would
increase time limits for instituting personal injury actions while decreasing
the limitation for property damage claims. In addition, the UPLA's statute
of limitations would not begin to run until the claim is discovered, rather
than from the date of the breach itself.'39 Therefore, the UPLA approach
would eliminate the confusion resulting from the necessary categorization
of a claim as personal injury or property damage,'40 and would eliminate
most situations where the statute precludes recovery before the claimant
discovers the existence of a cause of action.''
The procedural sections of the UPLA seek to accomplish three goals.
The first of these goals is to accelerate the process by which an injured
consumer receives compensation for his injuries. A six-month notice of
claims rule"' decreases the time usually expended 3 in consumer litigation
11 See UPLA § 109 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. 3008-09.
'' See UPLA § 109(B)(2) (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. 3010.
222 The UPLA drafters admit that the available data regarding claims for injuries caused
by older products is "limited". See UPLA § 109 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. 3009.
- UPLA § 109(C), 44 Fed. Reg. 3000.
M See VA. CODE §§ 8.01-230, 8.01-243 (1977).
'- VA. CODE § 8.01-243(A) (1977).
'36 Id. § 8.01-230.
" Id. § 8.01-243(B).
' Id. § 8.01-230.
'3, UPLA § 109(C), 44 Fed. Reg. 3000.
", See, e.g., Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 11-13, 168 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1969);
Friedman v. Peoples Serv. Drug-Stores, Inc., 208 Va. 700, 702-03, 160 S.E.2d 563, 565-66
(1968); Richmond Radev. & Hous. Auth. v. Laburnum Const. Corp., 195 Va. 827, 838-39, 80
S.E.2d 574, 580-81 (1954).
"' See, e.g., Barnes v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 406 F.2d 859, 862 (4th Cir. 1969); Caudill
v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 13-14, 168 S.E.2d 257, 259-60 (1969).
142 UPLA § 108, 44 Fed. Rag. at 2999.
"43 Many states adhere to a two or three year statute of limitations for personal injury
actions. Id. § 108 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Rag. at 3008; see, e.g., VA. CODE § 8.01-243A (1977).
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by using sanctions as an incentive for an earlier start of litigation.' 4 The
UPLA also proposes arbitration as an alternative to litigation for small
damage claims.' The UPLA's second goal is to emphasize equitable allo-
cation of liability among the parties responsible for a consumer's injury.
A major provision designed to reach this goal requires the use of compara-
tive negligence to allow each party's responsibility to be reflected in the
final compensation award. 4' Furthermore, the UPLA permits contribution
among the parties responsible for paying the consumer's damages.4 7 The
UPLA's third goal is to reduce the legal costs inherent in a consumer's
recovery by preventing extended litigation through arbitration.'," Several
UPLA provisions deter tactical litigation delays and frivolous claims or
defenses'49 with financial sanctions.
50
To facilitate more rapid compensation for consumer injuries, an injured
consumer must not delay an unreasonable length of time before entering
into an attorney-client relationship after the date of injury.' 5' Subse-
quently, the consumer's attorney must give timely notice of the claim to
any known potential defendant within six months of the time the attorney
accepted the consumer's case. 52 Similarly, the UPLA requires that a prod-
uct seller expedite the compensation process by furnishing to the con-
sumer's attorney (upon request) a list of all parties who either manufac-
tured or distributed the product causing the injury.'53 To enforce these
notice requirements, the UPLA imposes upon a noncomplying party liabil-
ity for all legal costs which the delay causes.'54 The UPLA, however, does
not bar any party from a claim or defense for failure to meet a notice
requirement deadline.'
5
The majority of cases resulting in consumer awards are not brought to
the manufacturer's attention until six months after the occurrence of the
injury.151 Such delay impedes a manufacturer's ability to recall or correctdefective products before they cause additional injuries. 57 In response to
"I See text accompanying note 154 infra.
14 UPLA § 116, 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001-02.
'"' Id. § 111, 44 Fed. Reg. at 3000.
' Id. §§ 112-113, 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001-02.
"' Id. § 116, 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001-02.
"' See text accompanying note 246 infra.
'50 See text accompanying note 247 infra.
,M, UPLA § 108(d), 44 Fed. Reg. at 2999.
152 Id. § 108(b), 44 Fed. Reg. at 2999. For UPLA purposes, the attorney-client relationship
arises when the attorney or any member or associate of the attorney's firm agrees to represent
the claimant's interest regarding the claimant's anticipated claim. Id.
I UPLA § 108(c), 44 Fed. Reg. at 2999.
's Id. § 108(e), 44 Fed. Reg. at 2999.
' Id., 44 Fed. Reg. at 2999.
Id. (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3008. The UPLA task force found that cases of con-
sumer injuries which were unreported for at least six months accounted for sixty-eight per
cent of all awards. Id.
"I UPLA § 108 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3008; see Note, Reforming the Law of Con-
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this problem, the six-month notice rule provides the manufacturer with the
opportunity to correct defects quickly, thereby avoiding the expense of
additional litigation arising from similar defects in like products. 8 In ad-
dition, the notice rule may benefit the consumer by allowing identification
of the proper parties to his suit. Discovery costs may be lowered because
the party most capable of identifying possible tortfeasors, the product
seller, answers the often time-consuming inquiries regarding who has han-
dled the defective goods.
Virginia does not have a notice requirement broadly applicable to prod-
ucts liability cases. Instead, a two year statute of limitations governs all
personal injury claims, and a five year statute of limitations controls
claims for property damage 59 The six-month notice rule would change the
time period in which most product liability cases must commence. Prod-
ucts liability suits brought on a breach of warranty theory, however, would
not be greatly affected since Virginia law requires such actions to be
brought within a "commercially reasonable time".6 0 Although not clearly
defined, this period is less than that two or five year period for other
consumer claims. 6 ' Adoption of the six-month rule may serve to define a
"commercially reasonable time".'62 As an added incentive to file suit
quickly, Virginia law provides that failure to give notice within the
"commercially reasonable time" bars a claimant from any recovery. "
Adoption of the UPLA notice rule with its sanction provision would pro-
vide the necessary incentive for early filing, without depriving a claimant
sumer Recovery and Enterprise Liability; Through the Uniform Commercial Code, 60 VA. L.
REV. 1013, 1035 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Reforming the Law].
"s' UPLA § 108 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3008; see Reforming the Law, supra note 157,
at 1035.
' ' VA. CODE § 8.01-243A (1977) (personal injury claims); § 8.01-243B (1977) (property
damage claims). The UPLA six-month notice rule governs both types of claims.
110 See VA. CODE § 8.2-607(3)(a) (1977).
"' See id. A "reasonable period" of time for application of § 8.2-607 is determined by
applying applicable commercial standards off "reasonable time". Id. Although the general
terms of the Code comment do not suggest a definite period of time, it is less than one year.
See generally Reforming the Law, supra note 157, at 1034-35.
"I Adoption of the UPLA six-month rule may cause a possible conflict as to whether the
six-month period supplants the vague "commercially reasonable" period of Va. Code § 8.2-
607. The two time period requirements may coexist if the Virginia courts utilize six months
as a guide to the length of a commercially reasonable time, retaining the power to extend
the period in appropriate circumstances. The major consideration of the UPLA, however, is
to allow the consumer to bring his claim within the normal statute of limitations period.
Therefore, the Virginia courts should give full effect to the UPLA provision by allowing the
UPLA sanction to supplant the Virginia absolute bar for claims not filed within a commer-
cially reasonable time. The courts thereby would have a guide to the length of time reasonable
for the filing of a claim before a consumer should be penalized for procrastination while
encouraging consumers to file claims quickly so as to afford manufacturers the opportunity
to remedy defective goods.
2" See VA. CODE § 8.2-607 (1977).
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of his cause of action." 4 Regardless of whether the six-month rule signifi-
cantly alters the time limit for bringing Virginia products liability suits,
the goals of accelerating compensation for injured consumers and facilitat-
ing defect correction by manufacturers are reasonable grounds for requir-
ing claimants to file suits well before the normal two to five year period.
The UPLA also proposes to expedite the compensation of a consumer's
injury by requiring mandatory but nonbinding arbitration for claims worth
less than $30,000."15 The UPLA arbitration provision is unique since it
expressly defers to state law in certain instances. In this statutory scheme,
the arbitration board applies the substantive law of the UPLA supple-
mented by applicable state law.'66 State law controls the procedural as-
pects of the arbitration board's proceedings, including the rules of evi-
dence.' The board returns its findings to the trial court after completing
its deliberations. "18 The court then enters the award as if it were the court's
judgment."' The arbitration boards would consist of an attorney, a techni-
cal expert and a layman'7' with authority to conduct arbitration hearings
and to make awards consistent with the act.'7'
Virginia arbitration law parallels the UPLA in many respects. Under
common and statutory law, civil litigants may submit their disagreements
,' One commentator has written that the "commercially reasonable" time requirement
of Va. Code § 8.2-607 is a trap for the consumer who is unaware of its time constraints. See
Reforming the Law, supra note 157, at 1034. This potential result is also contrary to Comment
4 of § 8.2-607 which holds that the "commercially reasonable time period" may be extended
to avoid depriving a "good faith consumer of his remedy". VA. CODE § 8.2-607 (Comment 4)
(1977).
"I UPLA § 116(a), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001. Any party to a consumer injury case may
petition the court for arbitration. Id. However, the UPLA does not provide a means by which
a party may oppose an arbitration motion.
166 UPLA § 116(b), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001.
67 Id. § 116(d)(2), & (f), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001. The UPLA only requires that the board
strictly observe state privilege rules. Id. § 116(f)(2), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001. Notwithstanding
this strict construction, the UPLA adopts a very flexible attitude towards arbitration proce-
dural rules. See id. § 116(0, 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001.
"I Arbitration proceedings must start within thirty days after the court refers the case
to arbitration. Id. § 116(e), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001. The court will grant an extension of this
period only upon a showing of good cause. Id. The UPLA also requires that the arbitration
process conclude as quickly as possible. Id. § 116(e) & (h), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001.
,69 Id. § 116(h), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001. Apparently, the UPLA does not allow the court
any discretion to accept the award if the parties do not move for trial de novo.
"77 Id. § 116(c), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001. The UPLA task force concluded that the arbitration
board should include a technical expert as a means of expediting arbitration proceedings. See
id. (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3015. The task force reasoned that such an expert could inform
the other two arbitrators of technical matters rather than requiring each arbitrator to become
versed in the technical matters of the case. In addition, a technical expert is on the board to
deter the presentation of biased technical testimony. The task force included a layman on
the board to represent the consumer point of view, and a legal expert to insure the correctness
of the legal aspects of the arbitration procedure and to advise the board on legal issues
involved in the particular case. Id.
' UPLA § 116(d)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001.
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to an arbitration panel normally composed of two or more persons.' 72 Mem-
bership on the arbitration panel does not require special qualifications.'
7
3
The panel's powers are specified in the "submission" which the court
delivers to the panel before commencing the proceedings.' 7 At the conclu-
sion of the panel's deliberations, the court enters the arbitration panel's
award as the judgment of the court from which the submission order origi-
nated. 75 Thus, while the UPLA would not change Virginia arbitration law
significantly, the UPLA would extend certain provisions such as specifying
the qualifications of arbitrators, so that arbitration panels would be better
adapted to deal with the legal and technical aspects of consumer litigation.
The UPLA award provisions differ from state law procedures on the
issue of appealability. The UPLA prohibits appeal of an arbitration award
once the court enters the award as a judgment.' 6 The nonappealability of
the award, however, does not bar a party from all post proceeding reme-
dies. Any party to the award may move for a trial de novo.' 77 If such a
motion is made timely, the case proceeds as if arbitration had not taken
place. 7 Evidence from the arbitration proceedings is inadmissible at trial,
except for impeachment purposes, and no party may mention at trial that
arbitration has occurred.7 9 Certain sanctions in the UPLA would deter
disgruntled parties from employing this procedure to gamble on a better
result at trial. 8 ' In contrast, Virginia law does not provide for a trial de
novo. Once the court accepts a valid arbitration award, the award bars
further action on the original cause.'"' Thereafter, the submission and the
I" See VA. CODE § 8.01-577 (1977); M. BURKS, PLEADING AND PRACrICE AT COMMON LAW §
10 (4th ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as BURKS]. Under Virginia common law, parties may
present a cause to arbitration without filing suit or obtaining judicial supervison. BuRKs,
supra, § 13. In addition, parties to a pending suit may ask the court to refer the suit to
arbitration. Once the arbitrators return an award, the court enforces the award as its own
judgment. Under each common law arbitration procedure, however, either party to the pend-
ing suit may revoke the arbitration procedure at any point before the award. Under the
statutory scheme, however, the parties to arbitration relinquish the right to stop the arbitra-
tion proceeding. Id.
I" BURKS, supra note 172, § 14. Any citizen of Virginia, including infants and lunatics,
may serve as an arbitrator. Id. See VA. CODE § 8.01-577 (1977).
"I A submission is an agreement among the parties to arbitrate. BUaKs, supra note 172,
§ 12. In the submission, the parties set forth the matters to be arbitrated and may include
procedures for the arbitrators to follow. Id. The submission and the Virginia rules of evidence
control the panel's proceedings. See VA. CODE § 8.01-577 (1977); BUaKS, supra note 172, § 17.
... See VA. CODE § 8.01-577 (1977); BURKS, supra note 172, § 20.
'76 UPLA § 116(h), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001.
I" Id. § 116(i), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001.
178 Id. § 116(i)(2), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001. A party does not forfeit any right to trial by jury
by invoking arbitration. Id.
'I Id. § (i)(3), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001-02.
"5 Any party failing to obtain a better result at the trial de novo than at arbitration is
liable for the costs of arbitration. Id. § 116(i)(4), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3002.
,8, Sydnor Pump & Well Co. v. County School Bd., 182 Va. 156, 167, 28 S.E.2d 33, 37
(1943). An arbitration award acts as a final judgment on all claims and matters contained in
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award provide the only basis for determining the rights of the parties to
the award."' The final award, however, is appealable to the Virginia Su-
preme Court."'
Despite the apparent differences between the UPLA and Virginia law,
the effect achieved by the two laws is very similar. Under the UPLA, a
party may be compelled to arbitrate without its consent.64 Since a disgrun-
tled party may avoid the arbitration award by trial de novo the harshness
of this provision is ameliorated.185 Thus, no party must accept an arbitra-
tion award without its consent.'86 Under Virginia law, however, a party
must consent to arbitrate before the arbitration process may commence. I67
Under the UPLA, a party to arbitration may have the legal and technical
issues of his case evaluated twice, once during arbitration and once in a
trial de novo.1ss This procedure effectively provides a party an appeal. In
contrast, in Virginia, a party may raise issues on appeal which only affect
the arbitration procedure collaterally, such as fraud in the proceedings.'6 '
As a result a party to arbitration in Virginia has only one opportunity to
raise the substantive issues of his case. Both the UPLA and Virginia law,
then, allow a consumer an appeal from an initial determination of the
merits of his case. The UPLA's appeal provision goes beyond Virginia law,
however, by allowing an appellant to relitigate the merits of the case.
The UPLA accomplishes its second goal of placing liability for a con-
sumer's damages on the party responsible for the injury through the use
of a comparative negligence system. The UPLA initially divides responsi-
bility between the consumer claimant and the defendants.'"" The UPLA
then apportions the liability among the various defendants according to
their respective degrees of fault."' To implement the comparative negli-
gence system, the UPLA requires the trier of fact to determine the amount
of damages that the claimant would receive in the absence of contributing
fault." 2 The trier of fact then must determine the degree of each party's
negligence, taking into account the nature and quality of each party's
acts."93 Based on these findings, the trial judge enters a verdict allocating
the submission. Id.; Equitable Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Stieffens, 154 Va. 281, 289, 153 S.E.
731, 733 (1930); BURKS, supra note 172, § 20.
112 Equitable Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Stieffens, 154 Va. 281, 153 S.E. 731 (1930).
"K See Crane v. Crane, 62 Va. 579, 581-82 (1871); 2A M.J., Arbitration & Award § 54
(1969).
See UPLA § 116(a), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001.
Id. § 116(i), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001-02.
196 Id.
" See note 172 supra.
See UPLA § 116, 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001-02.
"' 2A M.J., Arbitration & Award, § 54 (1964).
UPLA § 111(a), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3000.
Id. 111(b), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3000.
l,2 Id. § 111(b)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3000.
193 Id. § 111(b), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3000. The trier of fact allocates a percentage of the total
fault to each party found responsible for the claimant's injury. In its allocation, the trier of
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the responsibility for damages among the parties found liable. 41 Although
each party's liability is expressed as a percentage of the total liability, all
defendants are jointly and severally liable for the total amount of the
claimant's award. "5 The UPLA places this burden on the liable defendants
to insure that the claimant eventually will receive his full award, even if
one of those found liable becomes insolvent or his share becomes otherwise
uncollectible.'98
A claimant's cause is subject to the defense of contributory responsibil-
ity. At common law, contributory negligence was an absolute bar to a
claimant's recovery.' 7 Since Virginia has followed the common law rule, a
Virginia claimant's recovery is denied if the defendant proves that the
claimant contributed in any way to his own injury."' In this examination
of the common law, the UPLA task force found that the rule arose from
the judicial theory that a plaintiff must have exercised reasonable care for
his own safety in order to recover damages for a tortious injury.' 9 A person
fact may assign a percentage of the responsibility for the claimant's damages to the claimant
on account of contributing responsibility. The trier of fact, however, will not consider the acts
of parties to the accident who are not made defendant parties to the court action when
apportioning responsibility for the claimant's damages. Id.
"' UPLA § 111(b)(4), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3000.
Id.
,, If a liable party's obligation becomes uncollectible within one year of the entry of
judgment, any party to the original suit may petition the court for a redistribution of the
uncollectible obligation. Id. § ll(b)(5), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3000. If the court finds the obligation
to be uncollectible, it may order a pro rated distribution of the obligation to the other liable
parties. Id. For example, if a claimant was found to be 25% at fault in the original suit and
defendants A, B and C were found to be each 25% at fault the claimant could recover only
75% of his damages. If A became insolvent during the next year, either the claimant, B or C
could petition the court for a redistribution of A's liability. Upon a finding of A's insolvency,
the court could order the claimant, B or C to assume responsibility for a pro rata share of
A's obligation. Since the claimant, B and C were equally at fault, each would be liable for
one-third of A's obligation. Thus, the claimant would receive only two-thirds of the amount
A owed him (A's obligation reduced by the 33% of claimant's contributing responsibility).
Redistribution of A's liability does not relieve A of his responsibility altogether. Instead, A
still is liable to B or C for an action for contribution or to the claimant on the original
judgment. See UPLA § 111(b)(5), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3000.
"I Looney v. Metropolitan R.R., 200 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1905); Gordon v. Cummings, 152
Mass. 513, 25 N.E. 978 (1890); RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToS, § 467 (1965).
'" See District of Columbia v. Coleman, 214 Va. 12, 13, 196 S.E.2d 926, 927 (1973);
Tazewell Supply Co. v. Turner, 213 Va. 93,96,189 S.E.2d 347, 350 (1972); Gottlieb v. Andrus,
200 Va. 114, 118, 104 S.E.2d 743, 747 (1958). Contributory negligence is the failure of a
claimant to exercise ordinary care for his own safety which, together with the negligence of
another, causes his injury. Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266, 285, 198 S.E. 441, 450 (1938).
Although the defendant's negligence may have been greater than the plaintiffs, Virginia law
recognizes no gradations in fault in cases of contributory negligence. Smith v. Virginia Elec.
& Power Co., 204 Va. 128, 133, 129 S.E.2d 655, 659 (1963). Since the law will not allow a party
at fault to recover damages, the contributorily negligent plaintiff cannot receive compensa-
tion for his injuries. Richmond Traction Co. v. Martin, 102 Va. 209, 213, 45 S.E. 886, 887-88
(1903).
"I See UPLA § 111 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3011. In addition to requiring that a
plaintiff have a high regard for his personal safety, the common law contributory negligence
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who contributed to his own injury did not exercise reasonable care and thus
did not merit compensation."' The UPLA concurred that an individual
should be obligated to protect himself from harm, but the UPLA task force
concluded that an absolute bar to recovery was inequitable.10 Therefore,
the UPLA allows a defendant to raise the issue of contributing negilgence
as an affirmative defense to reduce damages; a claimant's contributing
negligence, however, will rarely be great enough to foreclose all recovery.
22
Under this defense, a potential reduction in the damages award will act
as an incentive for a consumer to exercise care in use of a product.2 "
Concurrently, liability for the remaining portion of the claimant's damages
would serve as an incentive to prompt manufacturers to use care in the
production and distribution of their goods.
20 4
The UPLA's comprehensive system for allocation of responsibility
rule derives from two additional theories. When the English courts originally developed the
contributory negligence rule, England was in the early stages of the industrial revolution.
Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of Comparative Negligence, 43 Mo. L. REv. 431, 432
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Fischer]. In response to industry's need for protection from
consumer claims, the English courts developed the contributory negligence doctrine as a
means of foreclosing most consumer actions. Id. Industry has now outgrown the need for
judicial protection from consumers. Rather, the proliferation of federal regulation of industry
for the consumer's sake indicates that the consumer has a greater need for protection from
defective goods. In addition, the common law pronounced that a court is incapable of deter-
mining varying degrees of fault. See Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REy. 465
(1953). This justification has been undercut as many state courts have held that they do
indeed have the ability to apportion fault. Id.
2w See UPLA § 111 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3011.
201 Id.
2102 The UPLA sets forth three common situations in which a consumer may be declared
contributorily negligent. The firstlof these situations is when a consumer uses a product
which is latently defective. UPLA § 111(c)(i), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3000. At common law a con-
sumer would have the duty to inspect a good before use since his failure to do so would bar
recovery. Id. (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3012. Under modem tort law, however, the consumer
has a right to receive a reasonably safe product that he should not have to inspect before
purchase or use. Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng. Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978); UPLA §
111 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3012; REsTATEMEr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Thus,
use of a defective product having a latent defect should not be contributory negligence. When
the defect is readily discoverable, however, the UPLA task force concluded that a consumer
using such a defective product should be charged with contributory responsibility, thereby
reducing his compensation award. See UPLA § 111(c)(1)(ii), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3000. The misuse
of products in a manner unforeseeable to the manufacturer is another common cause of
consumer injuries. Id. § 111(c)(3)(ii), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3000. The UPLA task force also deter-
mined the injured consumer should also be charged with contributory responsibility. Id.
Thus, a workman using a coke bottle as a hammer would be guilty of contributory responsibil-
ity which would result in a reduction of his damage recovery. See Fischer, supra note 199, at
435. In a third common situation, a consumer may intentionally use a product known to have
a defect. UPLA § 111(c)(20), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3000. If the use is unreasonable, such as driving
on a highway on a flat tire, then the UPLA denies any compensation for resulting injury. Id.
If the use was reasonable, however, recovery is appropriate. Id. Whether such use was reason-
able is a question of fact in each case. Id.
213 UPLA § 111 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3011.
204 Id.
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among joint tortfeasors parallels the contribution scheme in Virginia.2 1 A
claim for contribution under Virginia law arises when one tortfeasor has
satisfied a liability shared with another.2 16 In addition, the claim for contri-
bution does not require a formal adjudication of liability.2 7 Thus, a party
seeking contribution need only hold a valid claim against the party from
whom contribution is sought. 218 Consistent with its position on contribu-
tory negligence, Virginia does not allow a trial court to apportion contribu-
tion according to each tortfeasor's degree of fault. Instead, a party liable
for contribution is responsible for one half of the damages assessed against
the party seeking contribution."' Under this scheme, a tortfeasor who is
only twenty per cent at fault may pay one hundred per cent of the con-
sumer's claim. In the contribution action, this tortfeasor may recover only
fifty per cent of the amount that he paid to the claimant. In effect, the
tortfeasor is assuming fifty per cent of the consumer's damages while being
only twenty per cent at fault. The UPLA rejects this result as inequita-
ble.2 10 Instead, the UPLA provides that each defendant's liability should
be determined at trial thereby eliminating the need for a separate action
to determine such liability and may obviate the need for a contribution
action if all defendants pay their proportionate share of the award.2 1' If a
party has paid more than its allocated share, however, that party may seek
contribution at trial from another party which has not paid its full liabil-
ity.212 If for some reason a party's proportionate share of liability is not
determined at trial, contribution can be sought in a separate action .
1 3
Similarly, if contribution is sought from a party absent from the original
action, contribution may be enforced in a subsequent proceeding. " A
party who settles a claim can seek contribution only if the liability of the
party against whom contribution is sought has been extinguished, and
then only to the extent that the settlement is equitable.2 10 Therefore, in
each situation, no party bears more responsibility for the consumer's dam-
ages than which is in direct proportion to that party's degree of negligence.
The UPLA also addresses problems in the area of contribution *claims
against an employer covered by a workmen's compensation law. 216 Under
201 See UPLA § 111, 44 Fed. Reg. at 3000; text accompanying notes 208-215 infra.
10 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Minnifield, 213 Va. 797, 798, 196 S.E.2d 75, 76 (1973);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewel Tea Co., 202 Va. 527, 532, 118 S.E.2d 646, 649 (1961).
2 North River Ins. Co. v. Davis, 274 F. Supp. 146, 149 (W.D. Va. 1967).
2U Id.
209 Id.
210 See UPLA § 112 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3012.
211 Id. § 112 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3012.
212 Id. § 112 (a)-(b), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3000.
22 Id. § 112(c), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3000.
214 Id.
215 Id. § 112(d), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3000-01.
296 In a hypothetical situation, a manufacturer sells a defective saw to a lumbermill. The
lumbermill-employer compounds the saw's potential for injury by failing to install devices
to prevent accidents. In this condition, the saw seriously injures a worker. Disregarding
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the typical workmen's compensation statute, the employee receives fixed
compensation from his employer in return for relinquishing any tort claim
he might have against his employer."1 7 The employee still may sue the
manufacturer for full damages. The manufacturer, however, cannot shift
any liability onto the employer since the employer's liability is statutorily
limited to compensation payments."' Thus an employee may receive a
double recovery from compensation payments and a damage award. Fur-
thermore, if an employer is subrogated to the rights of his employee against
the manufacturer, the employer may be able to avoid all financial liability
for his negligence. The manufacturer, however, is left without recourse and
must suffer impact of the employee's damages.
2 1
1
In Virginia, a plaintiff in a contribution action may not sue a fellow
joint tortfeasor for contribution unless the party has a valid claim against
the other tortfeasor.2 11 A party seeking contribution may not bring a suit
for contribution against another tortfeasor which the plaintiff in the origi-
nal action could not sue directly.22' Moreover, a manufacturer should not
be able to seek contribution from an employer because the workmen's
compensation law prohibits an employee from suing his employer. This
result is based on two grounds. If a plaintiff cannot sue a defendant di-
rectly, the plaintiff and a second defendant might settle the cause fraudu-
lently for an amount equal to both the defendants' liability. Thereafter,
the second defendant could seek contribution against the first defendant
and recover the additional damages representing the first defendant's lia-
bility to the plaintiff.22 2 Additionally, allowing a manufacturer contribu-
tion against an employer would violate the employer's statutory liability
limitation. 22 A violation occurs because the manufacturer's claim for con-
tribution arises from the employee's suit against the manufacturer. Thus,
worker's compensation statutes, the worker could sue both his employer and the manufac-
turer or the manufacturer alone for his injury, while the manufacturer may sue the employer
for contribution. By this two step judicial procedure, each of the two negligent parties has
assumed its proper liability for the employee's injury. With the introduction of a workmen's
compensation statute, however, the situation changes and the manufacturer normally be-
comes solely liable for the worker's damages.
217 New Policies Bearing on the Negligent Employer's Immunity from Loss Sharing, 29
MAINE L. REV. 243 (1978).
218 Id.
219 Id.
212 See text accompanying note 208 supra.
22' See Norfolk & S. R.R. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 600, 174 S.E. 841, 842 (1934). In
Virginia, only statutory contribution is allowed since contribution is a deviation from the
common law that no contribution is allowed. Id. The contribution statute does not grant any
greater right to recovery than at common law. Therefore, the statute does not allow a contri-
bution action plaintiff to sue a joint tortfeasor who would have been liable to an injured
plaintiff in the original action. Id.
222 Id.
m See Jennings v. Franz Torwegge Mach. Works, 347 F. Supp. 1288, 1290 (W.D.Va.
1972).
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the employer is paying more for the employee's injury than mere compen-
sation payments.
Although the UPLA recognizes the arguments supporting the no contri-
bution rule, it rejects the rule in part.y2 The UPLA task force found that
an equally subscribed to position postulates that the result normally
achieved under the workmen's compensation statutes is inequitable . 2 2 To
redress this situation, an employer should be subject to impleading and
required to bear some liability for his negligence .2 In seeking to placate
both positions, the UPLA adopted a limited contribution rule.22 8 Under
this rule, an employer who negligently contributed to an employee's injury
is subject to contribution not exceeding the amount of compensation pay-
ments made to the employee.29 Although this proposal does not eliminate
the inequity in the present system, it mitigates the application of the no
contribution rule to the manufacturer. 0 In addition, the employer's liabil-
ity is limited to his compensation payments.? The UPLA solution also
creates a slight incentive for an employer to reduce workplace hazards
thereby retaining his immunity from contribution. 2 Although the UPLA
system is not yet widely accepted, one state has adopted a similar for-
mula . 3
The UPLA also defines the liability relationship between a manufac-
turer of a defective product and the party who actually sells the product
to a consumer. The UPLA proposes that a manufacturer of a defective
product should be responsible for any defects it creates.24 Several states
224 Id.
22 See UPLA § 113 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3013.
228 See Davis, Third-Party Tortfeasors' Rights Where Compensation-Covered Employers
Are Negligent Where Do Dole and Sunspan Lead? 4 HoFsTRA L. REv. 571, 573, 577 n.26, 591
(1976); Smith, Products Liability: A Compendium of Reform, 15 Hous. L. REv. 871, 882-84
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Smith].
2 See Smith, supra note 226, at 882-83. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered
immunity and subrogation rights of a negligent employer against the rights of a third-party
tortfeasor under the Pennsylvania contribution statute in Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d
105 (1940). The Pennsylvania court allowed the plaintiff to implead the negligent employer
on the ground that the statutory right to contribution would otherwise be defeated. Id. at 188-
89, 14 A.2d at 109. The court, however, refused to permit the right of contribution to outweigh-
the policy of limited employer liability, reasoning that "[it would be repugnant to the letter
and spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act and would frustrate its purpose to hold that
an employer who brings himself within the Act could notwithstanding that fact be held liable
to the payment of a judgment obtained by an employee." Id. at 192, 14 A.2d at 111. Therefore,
the court limited the third-party's constibution right to an amount for which the employer
was liable under the workmen's compensation statute. Id.; accord, Lambertson v. Cinncin-
natti Corp., 257 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Minn. 1977).
2 UPLA § 113, 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001.
22 Id.
2o See UPLA § 113 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3013.
231 Id.
M2 Id.
2 See Lambertson v. Cincinnatti Corp., 257 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 1977).
232 UPLA § 114(a), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001.
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extend this liability to any distributor of the product so that the retailer
of a defective product will be liable to the same extent as the manufacturer
for injuries resulting from use of the defective product.,, The UPLA rejects
this position because many distributors do not have an opportunity to
inspect a product before sale since an imposition of a duty to inspect a
product before sale would be economically unfeasible.2s Such a burden
would fall harshly on discount retailers who sell a large volume of goods in
sealed containers and who depend on low overhead costs to maintain a
profit margin. The UPLA therefore exempts distributors from liability to
a consumer when the distributor does not have a reasonable opportunity
to inspect the product.27 This duty of inspection does not include detailed
examinations for latent defects, but only such reasonable inspection as the
circumstances allow.?5 A distributor or retailer must exercise reasonable
care in the handling of goods, including warning consumers of known haz-
ards.
The nonliability of retailers for manufacturer's negligence provision is
inapplicable when a claimant cannot pursue his claim against the manu-
facturer. 9 Specifically, the UPLA provides that the inability to serve pro-
cess on the manufacturer, the manufacturer's insolvency, or the simple
difficulty in obtaining satisfaction of judgment from the manufacturer is
sufficient grounds for substitution of the distributor for the manufacturer
as the defendant in the consumer's suit.20 Although the occurrence of one
of these three contingencies may place an unfair burden on a distributor,
the UPLA task force reasoned that the consumer interest in recovery su-
persedes the distributor's need for immunity.24' This position, however, is
unsound on two grounds. Economically, this provision is not structured to
encourage manufacturers to maximize safety procedures in the production
of consumer goods.2 2 Instead, it places the entire compensation burden on
a distributor who may have no opportunity to correct the defect.2 3 In terms
of legal cost, the provision increases the necessity for litigation. If a manu-
facturer is an out-of-state entity not subject to service of process in the
consumer's state, the consumer is not forced to file suit in the manufac-
turer's jurisdiction.2 4 Rather, the consumer may file an action against the
211 See, e.g., Housman v. C.A. Dawson & Co., 106 Ill. App. 2d 225, 245 N.E.2d 886 (1969);
McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789-92 (Tex. 1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
2m UPLA § 114 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3014.
" Id. § 114(a), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001.
Id. (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3013.
=' UPLA § 114(b), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001.
240 Id.
'" See id. § 114 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 1013-14.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 See id. § 114(b), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001. Although jurisdiction over out of state manufac-
turers is possible through the use of many states' long arm statutes, not all states' jurisdic-
PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
distributor who is likely to be in the consumer's state.25 After the conclu-
sion of the initial suit, the distributor must initiate a second suit for reim-
bursement from the manufacturer for the distributor's payment of the
consumer's damages.2 8 Thus, two actions are necessary to adjust the finan-
cial burden of the claimant's injury. Therefore, a legislature considering
the exemption provision of the manufacturer-distributor relationship stat-
ute should carefully consider whether the need to compensate a consumer
in certain cases outweighs the distributor's general limitation of liability.
The UPLA achieves its third goal, reduction of legal cost, through a
series of provisions dealing with various stages of the legal process. In a
section intended to eliminate frivolous legal actions, the UPLA allows a
party to recover the costs of either defending against a frivolous claim or
overcoming a frivolous defense. 4 ' In addition, an attorney retained by the
claimant on a contingent fee basis may recover reasonable compensation
for services rendered in litigating a frivolous defense. '4" To discourage mis-
use of this cost recovery provision, the UPLA requires a showing, by clear
and convincing evidence that a claim or defense was without any reasona-
ble or factual basis.
2 4 9
Although few cases have considered the issue of civil remedies for frivo-
lous legal positions, the UPLA provisions are analagous to several existing
rules condemning frivolous suits. The Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibits an attorney from filing a suit or asserting a position which serves
only to harass or maliciously injure another party.21 In addition, a lawyer
who in bad faith knowingly advances a claim or defense unwarranted
under existing law is subject to disciplinary action.nI Similarly, the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure may subject an attorney to disciplinary action
when he files a pleading where no reasonable basis for the pleading ex-
ists. 2 Moreover, a party subjected to a frivolous appeal may recover dam-
ages and double costs from the offending party.ns Thus, the UPLA provi-
sion serves as an extention of civil liability to conduct prohibited by the
Code of Professional Responsibility and in a manner which parallels the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The UPLA frivolous legal action provision exceeds Virginia's remedy
for a party burdened with a frivolous legal action. In Virginia, a party's
tional statutes are broad enough to allow either a direct suit by a consumer or impleading of
an out of state manufacturer by a distributor.
245 Id.
248 See id. § 112, 44 Fed. Reg. at 3000-01.
247 UPLA § 115(a), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001.
2 Id. § 115(c), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001.
24 Id. § 115(b)-(c), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3001.
2 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILI DR 7-102(a)(1)(1976).
253 Id. DR 7-102 (a)(2).
212 FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
2 FED. R. App. P. 38.
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only recourse is an action for malicious prosecution.24 Unfortunately, this
action has a very limited application to instances where persons have been
subjected to a frivolous prosecution.ns Furthermore, the plaintiff must
prove that the frivolous suit was brought with a malicious intent. 6 A
frivolous prosecution defendant must also have had no reasonable cause
to believe in the propriety of the original action.27 Moreover, the courts
have limited the action to situations involving arrest, seizure of property
or other special injuries.2
8
The UPLA provision, however, does find some support in Virginia law.
The Virginia Supreme Court has adopted provisions analogous to the Code
of Professional Responsibility which make lawyers subject to disciplinary
action for asserting bad faith legal positions, claims or suits.2 The Su-
preme Court Rules of Virginia also require lawyers to file pleadings in good
faith and not to hinder the legal process.260 Therefore, the Virginia rules
which mandate disciplining lawyers for acting in a frivolous manner are
similar to those considered by the UPLA task force. Thus, adoption of the
UPLA frivolous claims legislation would extend a party's civil liability to
the professional liability placed on members of the Virginia bar for assert-
ing frivolous claims or defenses.
The UPLA also reduces litigation costs in consumer cases by limiting
recovery of nonpecuniary damages"' for certain injuries.26 2 Where a con-
sumer has not suffered serious disfigurement, permanent impairment of a
bodily function, or permanent mental illness resulting from a product re-
lated injury, the consumer's nonpecuniary award cannot be greater than
$25,000.213 Several courts have attacked the establishment of any limit on
a claimant's recovery on the theory that such a limitation denies equal
protection. 24 These courts have reasoned that an arbitrary limit prevents
a claimant with a valid claim for an amount exceeding the limit from
obtaining a fair recovery.2 5 Therefore, such a limit arbitrarily allows some
claims to be compensated fairly, while others are reduced to the limitation
figure.266 The UPLA draftsmen noted that the courts attacking limits on
13 BuRs, supra note 172, § 145.
See Wiggs v. Farmer, 205 Va. 149, 152, 135 S.E.2d 829, 831 (1964) (action for malicious
prosecution not favored at common law and should have limited use).
21 Id. at 152, 135 S.E.2d at 831.
257 Id.
258 See National Surety Co. v. Page, 68 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1932).
25 See VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RasPONsmurry DR 7-102(a)(1)-(2), 216 Va. 1089 (1976).
210 VA. Sup. CT. R. 1:4(a) (1977).
2 Nonpecuniary damages include "pain and suffering", but exclude damages such as
hospital costs, doctor's fees and lost wages. UPLA § 118 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3017.
282 UPLA § 118(b), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3002.
263 Id.
2" See, e.g., Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136 (N. D. 1978) ($300,000 limitation on




recovery are concerned with severely injured claimants not being compen-
sated fairly."6 7 Thus, the UPLA rejects a recovery limit on serious inju-
ries. 68 Another court has held that a limit on a claimant's recovery is not
violative of equal protection if the limitation is reasonably related to a
state purpose, " such as reducing uncertainty in litigation. 0 A reduction
of uncertainty may lower liability insurance rates since maximum liability
is established for many consumer cases resulting in less likelihood of a large
payment on policies. A limit on nonpecuniary damages also may tend to
lead to more arbitration, resulting in less consumer injury litigation.
The UPLA allows recovery of punitive damages from a defendant by
an injured claimant.' Although this does not reduce litigation costs di-
rectly, the intent is to deter manufacturers from producing unsafe goods.
27 2
Successfully deterring the production of unsafe products would reduce the
amount of consumer claims that require litigation. 3 A consumer may
recover punitive damages by presenting clear and convincing evidence that
his injury was the result of a product seller's disregard for his safety.
74
Under the UPLA, the trier of fact determines whether to allow punitive
damages. If the trier of fact concludes that punitive damages are appropri-
ate, the court then determines the amount of such damages. 5 Virginia law
is similar to this point. A Virginia tort plaintiff may recover punitive
damages upon proof of malice or recklessness or negligence sufficient to
demonstrate a conscious disregard for the rights of others. 7' The trier of
fact may award punitive damages, subject to court review only for exces-
siveness. 7 Adoption of the UPLA would bifurcate the process of awarding
punitive damages. Such a change allows a detatched judicial evaluation
of the case before, rather than after, damages are awarded which counter-
acts the possibility that a jury may be swayed by emotion to award exces-
sive and unwarranted punitive damages.
27 8
Finally, the UPLA task force favors modification of the collateral
source rule to reduce the costs of the legal process necessary to obtain
compensation for a consumer's injury. Under the Virginia collateral source
27 UPLA § 118 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3017-18.
298 Id.
288 See Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
270 UPLA § 118 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3017.
21, Id. § 120(a), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3002.
2 Id. § 120 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3018-19.
m Id.
27 UPLA § 120(a), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3002.
275 Id.
n' See Giant, Inc. v. Pigg, 207 Va. 679, 685-86, 152 S.E.2d 271, 277 (1967). Punitive
damages are recoverable only where misconduct or recklessness evinces a conscious disregard
for the rights of others. Id. Punitive damages are awarded not to compensate a claimant, but
to warn others and to punish the wrongdoers. Id.
7n See Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Anderson, 90 Va. 1, 8, 17 S.E. 757, 759 (1893).
8 UPLA § 120 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3018-19.
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rule,27 a claimant's recovery is not subject to reduction because of compen-
sation from other sources.8 0 A consumer may recover doctor's bills, hospi-
tal expenses and drug expenditures from a product seller even though the
consumer's health insurance already has paid the consumer for these
items. An injured consumer effectively recovers twice for the same in-
jury ."' Proponents of this position contend that such a double recovery is
not inequitable to the product seller since the consumer has paid a fee,
such as an insurance premium, to obtain the benefits of collateral source
compensation.2 ' Upon the occurrence of an injury, the value previously
surrendered by the consumer contractually obligated the collateral source
to compensate the consumer's damages. 8' Therefore, the injured consumer
receives the benefits regardless of the product seller's liability." Since the
consumer has paid for this right, and the obligation on the collateral source
to pay is independent of the seller's liability, courts hold that allowing a
collateral source reduction unduly benefits a liable product seller because
he has not given value to obtain the benefits of a reduction. ' Convinced
of the soundness of this reasoning when the consumer receives compensa-
tion from a private source, the UPLA task force adopted this position.28
When the collateral source is a public fund, however, the UPLA does allow
a reduction for benefits received from the public fund.28 The UPLA task
force reasoned that a consumer does not pay a fee to obtain the benefits of
public source compensation.288 The underlying basis of the no reduction
rule is not present and the consumer should not get the benefit from a
collateral source reduction rule. 9
Adoption of the UPLA would result in a number of changes in Virginia
law, many of which are advantageous. Hitherto, the development of a
products liability law in Virgina has occurred by the passage of a melange
of statutory provisions found in several different titles of the Virginia Code
as well as case law decided over a period of many years. Adoption of the
UPLA would consolidate these bits of products liability law into one com-
prehensive statute. Moreover, adoption would solve several inconsistencies
in Virginia consumer law. Injuries to a person may be sued upon two
different theories in Virginia, contract or tort.20 Each theory has some
27 See Johnson v. Kellam, 162 Va. 757, 764-65, 175 S.E. 634, 636-37 (1934).
21 UPLA § 119 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3018; see Gypsum Carrier, Inc. v. Handels-
man, 307 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1962); Thompson v. Milam, 115 Ga. App. 396, 154 S.E.2d 721
(1967); Johnson v. Kellam, 162 Va. 757, 175 S.E. 634 (1934).
"I See, e.g., Johnson v. Kellam, 162 Va. 757, 764-65, 175 S.E. 634, 636-37 (1934).




28 UPLA § 119 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3018.
= Id., 44 Fed. Reg. at 3018.
m Id.
289 Id.
2190 See text accompanying note 34 supra.
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distinct elements of proof as well as procedural differences. 9' Therefore,
one consumer suing upon a contract theory may not recover compensation
for his injury although a second consumer injured under identical circum-
stances but suing on a negligence theory may gain compensation. The
UPLA, however, would merge these causes of action so that the above
situation could not occur. Furthermore, the UPLA would provide codified
rules of evidence for admission of items of proof in products liability
cases."'2 Moreover, a unified theory of action would create one statute of
limitations for all causes of action involving personal injuries instead of
Virginia's current two.
2 93
There are disadvantages, however, to the adoption of the UPLA. Sev-
eral provisions such as comparative negligence would call for a radical
change in Virginia law.294 Thus, the legislature must carefully weigh the
arguments of the UPLA drafters against established state policy to deter-
mine whether such changes would be beneficial. In addition, the UPLA
would take away from consumers some stronger protective measures which
Virginia accords its citizens. For example, evidence of compliance with
industry custom or "state of the art" raises a presumption under the UPLA
that a product is not defective. 21 Virginia, on the other hand, does not have
such a presumption, thereby requiring a lower level of proof to establish
that a product was constructed negligently.296 Therefore, the legislature
should consider whether the UPLA should be adopted in its entirety for
the sake of uniformity or whether the protection of consumers requires
modification of the UPLA to meet the special needs of Virginia consumers.
The final consideration in debating the utility of a uniform products
liability law is the balancing of interests involved. In compiling the UPLA,
the task force carefully balanced the interests of manufacturers and con-
sumers.2 ' This balancing of interests can best be seen in the UPLA's provi-
sions concerning defects in products. The UPLA provides for a manufac-
turer's strict liability in tort for injuries resulting from products failing to
meet the manufacturer's own specifications.9 8 This position is easily un-
derstood since the manufacturer has control over the production of its
products while the consumer normally will not have even the technical
wherewithall to determine whether a construction defect is present or the
danger it poses. Therefore, the manufacturer's interest in low cost produc-
tion resulting from the absence of a duty to inspect for defects without
adequate testing must give way to the consumer's interests in obtaining
2
212 See text accompanying notes 32-41 supra.
2,2 See text accompanying notes 74-85 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 159-164 supra.
21' See text accompanying notes 190-204 supra.
295 See text accompanying notes 73-94 supra.
29 Id.
27 See UPLA, Introduction, 44 Fed. Reg. at 2996-97.
298 See text accompanying notes 32-39 supra.
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defect-free goods."'0 On the other hand, where injury to the consumer oc-
curs from a product produced in accordance with the manufacturer's speci-
fications (which are developed according to the best available technology),
the interest shifts. 0° Although a manufacturer should be liable for unsafe
goods, it should not be liable for failure to produce a good which is safer
than available design technology will allow.3 "1 Thus, the manufacturer's
interest in introducing new products should outweigh the consumer's inter-
est in safe goods since manufacturers are usually responding to consumer's
demands when they market new products which have not yet been proven
absolutely safe.112 Similarly, the UPLA task force has determined that a
manufacturer's interest in limited liability outweighs a consumer's need
for an unlimited recovery for injuries where the injuries are not of a perma-
nent or severe nature.0 3 Thus, the UPLA places a $25,000 limit on a con-
sumer's recovery in such cases . 3 Despite the task force's careful attempts
to balance the interests of the manufacturers and consumers, the task
force's conclusions should not be accepted without debate. Therefore, in
considering the adoption of the UPLA, the Virginia legislature should
make its own determination of which interests must have priority in any
given area.
WARREN L. JERvEY
PATRICIA A. VAN ALLAN
, See UPLA § 104 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3004.
30 Id.
301 Id., 44 Fed. Reg. at 3005.
302 Id.
313 UPLA § 118 (Analysis), 44 Fed. Reg. at 3017-18.
3 Id. § 118, 44 Fed. Reg. at 3002.
